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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE CORPORATION
FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR.*
INCORPORATION is a privilege granted by the public. It is a license to
use a particular form of organization as a means of acquiring private profit.
In payment for this privilege the corporation should return a benefit to the
general public and as long as there is relative equilibrium between private
advantage and public benefit, the matter of the public interest in the corpora-
tion is not one of pressing concern. However the development of an alleged
imbalance between these two interests has given rise to an increasing concern
with the problem of the nature and extent of the public interest in the cor-
poration.
While this problem has non-legal facets, the corporate form is largely
a legal institution. Hence, one must be concerned with legally protected
interests, or, to put it another way, with legally imposed duties arising from
that institution. Since the board of directors is charged with the task of dis-
charging corporate responsibilities, the legal question concerns the duties of
directors, if any, to the public.
In 1916 Justice Ostrander of the Supreme Court of Michigan expressed
the dominant legal thinking of the time on this question:
[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and
conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of share-
holders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others, and no one will
contend that if the avowed purpose of the defendant directors was to sacrifice
the interests of shareholders, it would not be the duty of the courts to interfere.'
The proponent of the contrary point of view in that celebrated case was
Mr. Henry Ford. Although some may have. doubted Mr. Ford's motives, it
was his expressed desire to reduce the price of his automobiles and by that
action and by increasing productive capacity, to spread the blessings of the
Model "T" to more of his fellow men. It was admitted that he could have
sold a larger number of Ford automobiles than he was currently producing
without reducing the price. Mr. Ford, however, labored under the impres-
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, member
of the Philadelphia Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the criticisms and suggestions of Dr.
Wayne E. Howard, Assistant Professor of Industry, and Dr. David C. Motter, Assistant Professor
of Economics, both of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in the preparation of this
article. They do not, of course, share responsibility for the opinions and conclusions expressed.
'Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1916).
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sion that the Ford Motor Company had made too much money and should,
by lowering prices, share some of its possible future profits with the public.'
This cavalier attitude toward monetary gain was not shared by a minority
of stockholders who held ten per cent of the stock of the corporation. Con-
sequently, a dispute arose which was decided by Justice Ostrander in favor of
the minority stockholders. It was the eminent justice's opinion that, "A busi-
ness corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end." '
Since the time of that decision, the feeling of corporate managers that
they have obligations beyond their duties to the stockholders has spread far
and wide. In January, 1929, virtually on the eve of the Great Depression,
Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Board of General Electric, expressed the
idea of the "trusteeship" of corporate directors,' an idea which has become
generally accepted dogma. Even such an eminent authority as Professor A. A.
Berle, who took the position in 1932 that directors were responsible only to
the shareholders, felt it necessary to recant, at least temporarily, in 1954.' The
matter has come to the point where one expert on management stated, "What
will no doubt be recorded by historians as the ethical awakening of American
business constitutes one of the dramatic developments of the past quarter-
century." I
What, then, is the nature of this new responsibility? From the legal point
of view there is no new responsibility. The matter is one of sheer dogma, and
the law is sufficiently clear to negate the necessity for citations. Except as
implemented by statutes concerning charitable gifts by corporations,7 the state-
ment by Justice Ostrander in the Ford Motor Company case 8 remains correct.
Legal dogma says that although the board of directors is elected by the share-
holders, it is not to be controlled by the shareholders, but rather is to have
free reign in the determination of corporate policy. However, they are guided
2 It may be contended that the defendant's argument in this case was unsound from the point
of view of economic theory. Mr. Ford may have seen that the demand for automobiles was elastic
in the relevant price range, i.e., that total revenue would rise as the price decreased. If this were
the case maximum profit could have been realized by decreasing prices, as long as additions to
revenue exceeded additions to cost.
a Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 1.
'Reproduced in HURFF, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ENTERPRISE IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 113
(1950).
5 BERLE, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees; a Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365
(1932); subsequent comment in BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169
(1954).
6
SELEKMAN, A MORAL PHILOSOPHY FOR MANAGEMENT 3 (1954).
7 EELS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY 16 et seq. (1956).
S Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 1.
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by an underlying responsibility to serve the shareholders, presumably by max-
imizing profits.
Management theory, to the extent that it is concerned with legal dogma,
has gone a considerable distance in explaining its substance and detail. Pro-
fessor Gordon, for instance, states that the board of directors ". . . is supposed
to exercise a broad supervision. This broad supervision presumably includes
several types of activities: choice of the major executives (or at least the chief
executive), establishment of general objectives, formulation of broad policies,
a general appraisal of the operating and financial results of the firm's activ-
ities, and the distribution of profits." ' On the other hand it appears that
some theorists impose responsibilities in addition to these basic duties and
add that:
The essential concern of corporation directors, particularly in our large
corporations, is not today, nor should it ever have been, merely protection of
stockholders and their interests. It is the reconciliation of private enterprise
with the smooth functioning of a democratic society with justice to all groups:
stockholders, executives, employees, creditors, customers, and the public. Such
a broad concept of the functions of directors is frequently overlooked. 10
Representatives from the field of finance have also thought in broad
terms. For example, the recent book entitled Shareholder Democracy " con-
tains the statement that "The interests of shareholders are not the only in-
terests beside management's that must be recognized by today's publicly held
corporation. There are the interests of labor, of the consumer, of the country
as a whole, and ultimately of the entire international community that must
be considered." 12
It appears that management itself has not been adverse to this broader
responsibility."5 Indeed, its attitude as evidenced by policy directives" as well
as speeches, indicates a concern for the broader consequences of corporate
9 GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 116 (1945); BAKER, DIRECTORS
AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 131 (1945).
10 BAKER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 138. See also CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 193 (1948); DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 99 (1949).
"EMERSON AND LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954).
12 Id. at 149.
13 CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 222.
14 See LEWIS, Measuring, Reporting and Appraising Results of Operations with Reference to
Goals, Plans and Budgets, in A CASE STUDY OF MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL AT GEN-
ERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 29 (Controllership Foundation, Inc., 1957) where eight "key result
areas" are listed as profitability, market position, productivity, product leadership, personnel de-
velopment, employee attitudes, public responsibility and balance between short-range and long-range
goals. At page 39 "society" is defined as including "shareowners, customers, employees, vendors,
the plant community, the business community, educational institutions and all areas of govern-
ment." Specific means of measuring responsibility to these groups is then set forth.
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action. 5 It has also been said that a number of large corporations have placed
one or more directors on their boards whose function it is to represent the
"consuming public." 16 In addition, corporations have come to look upon
their potential or charitable giving as a means of discharging, at least in part,
their assumed for existing obligations to the public."' These acts constitute
somewhat more than mere lip-service to the new theory of management's re-
sponsibilities.
In order to comprehend clearly the development and growth of this
theory, it is helpful to ascertain the cause of the attitude toward expanded
responsibilities of corporations in general and in particular, of corporate di-
rectors. In part, the development is due to reaction to the various types of
criticism which have been leveled against corporations and their managers in
the past.
That corporations have long been the object of distrust and that palliative
measures have been adopted since, and before, the anti-trust acts is common
knowledge. While remedial legislation has been directed against specific
evils, criticism has tended to turn from comment on particular ills to the
questioning of basic theory.
Criticism of the early twentieth century was painfully explicit and it was
not uncommon at that time for the managers of vast corporations and trusts
to be accused of manifold evil practices such as the deception of stockholders,
private profit to directors, price discrimination, economic pressure on suppliers
of goods, niggardly wages to employees, harmful working conditions, nefari-
ous political activity, monopolistic tendencies, and unscrupulous methods in
general.18 Remedial legislation followed, and the consequent governmental
control restricted the demons to a large extent. This type of legislation, di-
rected toward specific problems, continues to this day. During the "thirties,"
it took the form of securities legislation, directed in part toward the protec-
tion of investors in corporations. Another type of comment also emerged
which was directed at the nature of the modern, large-scale corporation. This
comment concerned the phenomenon of the separation of ownership and man-
agement, and first received extended treatment by Berle and Means. " It was
noted by the now Justice William 0. Douglas who referred to it as "... the
15 HURFF, op. cit. supra note 4, at 114.
16 REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM 57 (1950).
17 See generally, EELS, op. cit. supra note 7." He notes, however, at page 6, the existence of
pockets of resistance to this idea among those who believe "that corporations are business under-
takings" pure and simple.
ISJENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 213-217 (1909).
10 BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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vicious practice of having the board controlled or dominated by the man-
agers." 20 This control was accomplished by the device of naming the proxy-
holders, for, as Justice Douglas pointed out at that time, "The group that names
the proxyholders controls the board." 21
Having noted the phenomenon of management control of corporations,
it was time to examine the consequences. At this point the basic theory that
the board of directors was responsible solely to the shareholders was brought
seriously into question. One observer, in 1939, noted at least nineteen points
at which business became affected with a public interest 22 and concluded that
"every business is affected with a public interest of one sort or another." 23 If
it is true that business, especially big business which operates by necessity in
the corporate form, affects the entire population to a large degree,24 then it
must follow that corporate managers have a duty, at least moral, to this vast
group. If this point of view involves more than an attempt to maximize cor-
porate efficiency, then it is at variance with the logic of the law which makes
management responsible solely to the stockholders.
Accepting the fact that corporations have an impact on the economy and
the fact that corporations are controlled by managers who, generally, have no
substantial ownership interest in them, one might drop the matter, and leave
it up to the managerial group to discharge properly its moral obligations in
this regard. Others who have given a substantial amount of thought to the
question of effectuating more responsibility to this vague public interest believe
that this moral obligation should be enforced by using available legal doctrines.
From a legal point of view one way of implementing a responsibility is
through the concept of the trustee. The immediate difficulty in applying this
concept is that the trusteeship of directors has been classically treated as a
responsibility to the shareholders and, to some extent, to the creditors of the
corporation and to the corporation itself. It is not a duty towards outside
groups such as labor, consumers, or the public at large.25 Even the trusteeship
responsibilities of corporate management toward shareholders can only be
20DoUGLAS, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1307 (1934).
21DoUGLAS, supra note 20, at 1316.
22 CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 150 et seq. (1939). Clark, at page 186, defines
"public interest" as follows: "A public interest arises whenever particular conditions are present
such that free contract does not produce its normal benefits to any group or groups whose essential
interests are involved, and where the resulting evils are substantial enough to outweigh the general
presumption in favor of liberty."
23 ld. at 163.
24 DRUCKER, op. cit. supra note 10, at 29-30.
25 DODD, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable,
2 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935). Professor Dodd said, at 206, that "Profit-making for ab-
sentee owners must be the legal standard by which we measure their conduct until some other
legal standard has been evolved."
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enforced by means of the cumbersome route of the shareholders' derivative
suit.2"
Another possible route for enforcing this trusteeship duty is through the
facilities of courts of equity. It has been proposed that the visitorial powers
of courts of equity, which have historically been used only in the cases of public
corporations and charitable corporations,2 7 might be revived and expanded and
put into the hands of district attorneys. 8
Third, and perhaps the most drastic device, is the threat of corporate dis-
solution, called by one writer "The Judicial Guillotine." 29 This device is so
brutal that courts are loath to use it, although they undoubtedly have the
power to do so when shareholders' interests are completely ignored.
It appears that the major difficulty in attempting to adapt the usual doc-
trines of law to the matter is that the problem itself is a creation of economic
and social conditions which differ in scope and nature from those that existed
when the present legal corporate relationships were created and present doc-
trines were formulated. The legal rule making the directors responsible solely
to the corporation and its shareholders was a sensible response to the social and
economic conditions of a century ago. Those conditions have largely changed,
and to no little extent the changes have occurred because of the existence of
the corporate form. The continuance of the same mandate to the directors
at this time produces new consequences that were not contemplated at the
time the original scheme of corporate management was created. As Pro-
fessor Berle has stated: "If we were building the American economic system
anew, we might wonder whether the present system of stockholders' votes
was the best way, or even a good way, of choosing managers or of locating
power. It continues chiefly because no one has come up with a better
scheme." "
It is demonstrable that the corporation of over one hundred years ago
bore but little relationship to the corporation of today. The major points of
similarity are the theory of the corporate entity, the management of the enter-
prise by a board of directors elected by the shareholders, and the existence of
some sort of ownership rights in those shareholders. The points of dissimilar-
26 REUSCHLEIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 27.
27 This is reminiscent, at least, of the duty of visitation of religious houses imposed by canonical
law. See McVANN, Episcopal Visitation of Religious Foundations, 17 THE JURIST 41 (1957).
28 REUSCHLEIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 28.
29 Id. at 34.
80 BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 107 (1959). GORDON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 342,
states that "The executive group is stronger, and the board of directors weaker than the law
assumes."
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ity are much greater in number. For example, the corporation of one hun-
dred years ago did not have non-voting stock, may or may not have permitted
proxy voting, had limited purposes for existence, could not act as a holding
company, had limits on possible capitalization, may not have had limited liabil-
ity, and could not have had no-par stock.31 Nor at that time had cumulative
voting even been conceived. All of the changes, with the exception of non-
voting stock 32 and, in some jurisdictions, of cumulative voting,33 are taken
for granted today.
Of these changes all but two, cumulative voting and no-par stock, add
to the power of management. Of the factors that aid management to obtain
and perpetuate control, proxy voting may well be the most important. Anom-
alously, only the existence of the right of shareholders to vote by proxy per-
mits management to name its own board of directors.14 Behind the effective-
ness of the proxy which adds to management's power is the general apathy
of shareholders concerning their right to vote.3 Most stockholders regard
their shares as an asset to be sold or retained depending on the actions of the
stock on the financial pages of the daily newspapers .3  One is reminded of
the time-worn anecdote about the stockholder in Seaboard Airlines who did not
realize he held railroad stock until he sold it six and one-half months after
the purchase.
Non-voting stock is also an aid to management, since the denial of voting
rights to any group of shareholders necessarily reduces the number of shares
that need be owned or controlled in order to control the corporation.
The expansion of permissible purposes for which corporations may be
formed and the concomitant removal of all restrictions on capital accumulation
made possible the giant corporation which has so much impact on the general
public and on the economy of the nation. These two factors also necessitate
the diffusion of stock ownership and the resulting dilution of stockholder vot-
ing power that enables, and perhaps even requires, management to control the
proxy machinery. Allied to these is the possible use of the holding company
which multiplies the power of those who control it. Since the holding com-
pany may control other corporations by the expedient of owning a prepon-
31 The rules of the New York Stock Exchange prohibit no-par stock by requiring a stated par
value. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE DIRECTORY AND GUIDE E187, para. 9.
32 WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 59 (1951) states that non-voting stock is a
legacy of the 1920's.
a3 Cumulative voting was not permitted in ten states in 1951, and was only permissive in
seventeen states at that time. Id. at 9.
4 DOUGLAS, supra note 20, at 316.
.I REUSCHLEIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 1-2.
36 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 63.
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derance of shares in them, those in control of the holding company can ef-
fectively operate the others.
Of all the factors mentioned, only cumulative voting has a possible de-
terrent effect on the aggrandizement of management power. It is not par-
ticularly surprising, therefore, that it is the sole change in the corporate form
that has met with objection from management. Apparently, management is
opposed to the "strong note of partisanship that may be brought to the board
when minority interests are represented." 11
There is a definite public interest in business. Consequently, there is a
corresponding interest in corporations, although these interests must be sep-
arated. The public is interested in those aspects of business which affect it-
product prices and quality, monopoly, trade practices, and in other myriad
problems. Although the corporate form is the common mode of association
in business, particularly big business, it is incorrect to think of this general
interest in business as an interest in the corporation itself. It is true that
corporations are also controlled by general business legislation, not because
they are corporations, but merely because they are in business. Such legisla-
tion "can scarcely be regarded as forming part of the law of corporation." 38
Are there not then aspects of a corporation in which the public has an
interest that are not also a part of business in general? The answer must be in
the affirmative, for clearly the public is interested in the fact that there is a
corporate form, and in the nature that form takes.
It has been shown that the nature of the corporate form was consider-
erably different when first used for business purposes than it is today.1 9 It is
these changes in form, structure or organization, which have enabled the locus
of power in corporate affairs to shift. Professor Jenks saw the importance of
the form of the corporation in giving power to or denying power from its man-
agers and remarked at the turn of the century that this was the pressing prob-
lem of the day. He noted that "Any student of corporation law, upon reading
the charter and by-laws, can readily tell from the power that is put into the
hands of the directors whether they are in a position to manage the corpora-
tion in their own interests as against those of the stockholders, or whether
the stockholders are given the power of control." 40 It is because of the grad-
37 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 183. Williams does note, however, at page 185, that
"Irresponsible managements will probably be among the last voluntarily to adopt cumulative
voting."
38 DODD, American Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today, in 3 LAw, A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, at 277 (1937).
" See page 362 supra.
40 JENKS, op. cit. supra note 18, at 125-126.
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ual changes in the corporate form, and concomitant changes in the size of
corporations, that the power to control them has accrued to corporate managers.
Professor Berle has epitomized the changes very simply and accurately
as a change from "owner control" to "working control" to "management con-
trol." I The term "owner control" needs no explanation. By "working con-
trol" he means control by means of the ownership of a minority of the out-
standing shares. These minority shareholders can, by voting as a block, and
by controlling the proxy system, keep the control of the corporation out of
the hands of a scattered, lackadaisical, disinterested and unorganized majority.
"Management control" is the system effective today in most large modern
corporations. Management has obtained control of the proxy system and
can effectively appoint to the board of directors members of its own ranks, or
persons agreeable to it. 2 It requires the disinterest or acquiescence of all
stockholder groups in order to succeed. This power of management has re-
sulted from a number of causes, some legal, and some economic.
Until approximately the 1830's, lawyers and judges generally thought
that all corporations were affected with a public interest. Chief Justice Horn-
blower of New Jersey, as late as 1834, remarked that ". . . public good is the
avowed object of all such institutions; and however private property and
emolument may be involved, the public have a deep and important interest
in the government and success of every one of them. In short, they are all,
in an important sense, public institutions." " The concurring opinion of Justice
Ford in the same case implemented this concept by stating as follows:
But that the public have no interest at stake, in these private corporations,
will appear to be a mistake of vast magnitude, if it be considered how vitally
these corporations are connected and interwoven with the most important public
interests of the state, with the public highways, with the common transportation
and exchange of commodities, with paper bills as mediums of currency, and
their influence over commerce; with agriculture, with education, and with reli-
gion. It is for the promotion of one or another of these great public objects,
that these acts of incorporation have been passed. 4"
This view was, however, somewhat anachronistic for the attitude that cor-
porations were closely allied to the public interest was already dying, and by
41 BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY Ch. 2, passim (1959). In this chapter he develops,
in addition, the proposition that control may next go from the present management group to
control by fiduciary institutions such as mutual funds and insurance companies whose investments
in corporate stock are immense and constantly growing.
42 BERLE, id. at 108, states that it is unlikely that men with the qualities and skills necessary
for membership on a competent board of directors "could be personally popular among many
thousands of shareholders" and concludes that management is more likely to discover and choose
such individuals than would be the stockholders.




mid-century was dead. Courts were saying that, except in the case of the
newly emerging public utility concept,45 private business corporations were
run purely for the benefit of shareholders and no one else." In 1852, for in-
stance, a Michigan court said:
The object of strictly private corporations is to aggregate the capital, the
talents, and the skill of individuals, to foster industry and encourage the arts.
Private advantage is the ultimate, as well as the immediate object of their cre-
ation, and such as results to the public is incidental, growing out of the general
benefits acquired by the application of combined capital, skill, and talent to
the pursuits of commerce and of trade, and the necessities and conveniences of
the community.47
That attitude continued in legal and non-legal circles into the 1930's. Cor-
porations were deemed good because they had a beneficial effect on commerce
and industry, but their basic purpose was private profit. Today in certain in-
stances we question the beneficial impact of the corporation on society and as
a result, like the earlier jurists, express public concern over the broader con-
sequences of corporate action. In the meantime, however, we operate cor-
porations in the form in which they were developed, despite the fact that its
form crystallized in an era of belief in the philosophy of private profit, not
public benefit.
The corporation as we know it was a conscious creation of a mechanism
which, it was hoped, would accomplish a desired result. In this regard, the
importance of law was emphasized by John R. Commons, the institutional
economist, who said:
Economic phenomena, as we know them, are the result of artificial selec-
tion and not of natural selection. Their evolution is like that of a steam engine
or a breed of cattle, rather than like that of a continent, monkey or tiger. If you
watch how the steam engine evolved from John Watt in 1776 to the Mogul
locomotive in 1923 you will see how economic institutions evolved. The steam
engine evolved by studying the mechanisms of nature, experimenting with the
parts, and then rearranging them, so that steam would act in two directions
instead of one direction, as nature intended. So with the evolution of that
process of behavior which we name political economy. The subject-matter is
the habits, customs and ways of thinking of producers, consumers, buyers,
45 According to COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 328 (1924), the distinction
between private business and public business was purely accidental. Until the time of Adam
Smith (1776) all who were in business, that is, all who dealt with the general public for profit,
were in public business. The term "private business" was anomalous, for if one was acting solely
in his own affairs he was hardly in "business." This proposition could easily be supported by
reference to the vast variety of controls in pricing, quality, and the like, that existed before the
Industrial Revolution.
46 DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 160 (1954).
47 Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 (1852).
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sellers, borrowers, lenders and all who engage in what we name economic trans-
actions. The method has been the adoption of common rules applying to the
similar transactions of all who come within the same concern. If you watch the
development of the credit system out of the customs of businessmen in buying
and selling, borrowing and lending, and out of the customs of courts in deciding
disputes, according to the changing common rules, you will see how political
economy evolved. The desirable customs were selected gradually by the courts,
the undesirable customs were progressively eliminated as bad practices, and out
of the whole came the existing economic process, a going concern, symbolized
by a flux of prices, and operating to build up an artificial mechanism of rules of
conduct, creating incorporeal and intangible property quite different from the
unguided processes of nature.48
This process of artificial selection is also true of the corporation, with the
distinction, however, that the evolution of the modern corporation resulted
mainly from statutes rather than the processes of the common law.
Legal changes in the corporate form that enabled managers to achieve
their present position of dominant control was aided by the prevailing eco-
nomic philosophy of the nineteenth century. That philosophy was one of
rampant laissez-faire. It was thought that business should be permitted to
control itself, without governmental interference, and that the stronger busi-
nesses would survive and grow, and the weaker ones would die off. The
testimony of Adam Smith stating that private interests should be free of gov-
ernmental control and be permitted to form and organize as they saw fit, could
be called in support of this philosophy."9 On the other hand, those who em-
braced laissez-faire gave no significance to the fact that it was also Adam
Smith who desired the limitation of joint-stock companies to only four func-
tions,"° and those, on analysis, cannot be undertaken without exceptionally
large amounts of capital. Corporations, particularly the monopolistic variety
extant in the England of his day, were objectionable to him on the ground,
among others, that they "restricted the liberty of the individual by majority
vote." 1 To that extent corporations were as undesirable as governmental
interference, for both interfered with the liberty of the individual and with
competition. But, by ignoring the specific counsels of Adam Smith and by
adopting his general principles, incorporations were facilitated. Consequent-
ly, the corporation of today is much more powerful than those of which Adam
Smith disapproved.
48 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 45, at 376-377.
49 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 45, at 362.
50 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS Bk. V, Ch. 1, part III, Art. 2nd, pp. 713-714 (Modern
Lib. Ed. 1937).
51 COMMONS, op. cit. supra note 45, at 385.
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During the era from 1825 to 1920, tools were created which enabled
the present corporate complex of power to exist. These tools were fashioned
during an era that viewed the corporation as a means for the acquisition of
purely private profit, although it was genuinely hoped that public benefit
would also result from their existence and activity. Abuses, such as frauds
and stock swindles and market cornerings, were discouraged by legislation
and judicial decision, but the corporation itself was considered a beneficial
institution.
The right to vote by proxy and the concomitant right to solicit proxies,
were among the earliest tools fashioned by the law. Today, the right to vote
by proxy is generally given by statute or state constitution, and even where
not so given, it is within public policy to provide for proxies in the by-laws.52
At common law, however, there was no right to vote by proxy." That rule,
presumably, was a carry-over from the days when corporations existed solely
for municipal and charitable purposes, since the members of those corpora-
tions had no financial interest in them. Personal presence, discussion, and
vote were essential. 4 On the other hand, the right to vote by proxy had
existed in some English charters since the early part of the eighteenth century.5
In the United States progress toward the proxy right took one of two
routes, depending on how a given state decided a basic question of public
policy. The first route was to introduce proxy voting by means of a by-law.
This depended on whether or not the courts of the state involved believed
that such a by-law provision was within public policy. The second route was
to permit proxy voting by express statutes, or by the inclusion of such a pro-
vision in corporate charters. Either of these could make the proxy right
mandatory, or could permit the corporation to bestow that right.
The first case to pass on the validity of the first route (whether or not
it was within public policy for the by-laws alone to confer the proxy privilege)
was a Connecticut case decided in 1812.56 After reviewing the origins of
corporations, and noting that banking corporations were commonly given the
right to vote by proxy in their charters, the court stated that, "In short, the
difference between money corporations, and others, such as towns and so-
cieties, and all of the like kind, is so manifest, that the rules applicable to each
5
2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 2050 (1952).
53 ibid.
54 AxE, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38. Professor Axe adds, at page 38, that in
England "Since the charter was issued by the crown, the corporation was considered part of the
government and each member of the corporation was entitled to one vote if given by him in
person." See also, State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day 329 (Conn. 1812).
55 AxE, supra note 54, at 41.
56 State ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, 5 Day 329 (Conn. 1812).
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are by no means similar." 51 In consequence, it was decided that the by-laws
alone could confer the proxy privilege without assistance from any statute
or charter provision.
This case was followed in the dictum of an 1829 New York case that
cautiously approved the same approach.5" On the other hand, New Jersey
did not view the proxy privilege with approval when conferred by by-law
alone.5" On the grounds that proxies were only for the convenience of the
members of the corporation and not for the good of the corporation itself, it
declared such action to be against public policy. However this view was destined
to be defeated in the light of the widespread use of the proxy in other juris-
dictions, by charter grant and by statute. For the major portion of the nine-
teenth century, proxies could be given by virtue of by-law provisions alone."°
But, there were a few jurisdictions that expressly prohibited the proxy right
by statute. Georgia, for instance, by an 1890-91 statute, permitted only per-
sons who had title and ownership of stock to vote the stock.6'
The fact that proxies were not contrary to public policy may be inferred,
since legislative acts were passed which regulated proxies, even though the
right to vote by proxy had not been expressly conferred by a general statute.
62
General incorporation statutes provided for proxy voting as early as the
famous New York statute in 1811.63 Some states preferred to insert a right
to vote by proxy in those all-inclusive state constitutions adopted in the 1870's.64
The process of complete approval of proxies without regulation (such as on
7 Id. at 335.
58 Philips v. Wickham, 1 Pai. Ch. 590, 598 (N.Y. 1829).
59 Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J. Law 222 (1834).
60 Perry v. Tuskaloosa Cotton Seed Oil Mill Co., 93 Ala. 364, 9 So. 217; (1890) (dictum);
Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 52 Pac. 225 (1895); Commonwealth v. Detweiler,
131 Pa. 614, 18 At. 990 (1890); Commonwealth v. Bringhurst, 3 Whart. 134 (Pa. 1883);
ANGEL. AND AMES, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 128, p. 110 (4th ed.,
1852); COOK, STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS § 610 (1887); MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 486, p. 459 (2nd ed., 1886).
6oWitham v. Cohen, 100 Ga. 670, 28 S.E. 505 (1895), citing Acts of Ga., 1890-1891,
p. 172. Professor Reuschlein suggests that perhaps the only effective way to stop "proxy
abuses" is to eliminate proxies, and substitute an absentee ballot system with detailed questions
to be voted upon. REUSCHLEIN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 58.
62 E.g., Pa. Act of 1814, March 31, P.L. 154, 6 Sm. L. 154; Pa. Act of 1820, March 28,
P.L. 169, 7 Sm. L. 320 § 1.
63N.Y. Laws (1811) c. 67, p. 111, esp. § 3. See also, Md. Laws (1838) c. 267, § 5;
N.H. Laws (1846) c. 321, § 5; N.J. Pub. Laws (1841) p. 116, § 2. Pennsylvania's 1849
general incorporation act provided there should be no proxies for stockholders residing within ten
miles of the place of shareholders' meetings, and that no one person should be a proxy for more
than two shareholders. Pa. Laws (1849), No. 368, p. 363, § 4. The modern right to vote
by proxy was not conferred in Pennsylvania until the Act of 1903, March 5, P.L. 14, § 1, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 109 (1903).
64E.g., Illinois. See, People ex rel. Chritzman v. Crossley, 69 I. 195 (1873). See also,
Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895).
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the number of shares that could be voted by a proxy holder) was not com-
pleted in all states even by the end of the nineteenth century.6"
In this area, the pockets of resistance to change were rendered impotent,
at least in the cases of important and nation-wide corporations, by a sort of
inverted "Gresham's Law" of corporations. Instead of driving out "good"
corporations, this evolution drove the "bad" corporations to states with more
generous incorporation provisions-a tendency that still exists.66
Another change in the development of this new corporate concept was
non-voting stock which is a complete negation of the classical position that
each shareholder should have a vote. The development of the general rule
that non-voting stock is permissible in the absence of an express statute to the
contrary is an interesting one. One of the early cases on the matter involved
the validity of a non-voting provision in preferred stock.67 The New York
court decided that the provision was valid, despite the protestations of holders
of the preferred stock that it was contrary to the provisions of the New York
Constitution and certain of the statutes of that state. In doing so, the court
relied on a Missouri case decided four years earlier on constitutional grounds
which held that there was no prohibition against the issuance of non-voting
preferred shares.6" There were other states in this country, as well as Eng-
land, which upheld non-voting stock,69 but no court had directly passed upon
the validity of this principle, except for an Ohio court." The Ohio decision,
handed down in 1890, marks the beginning of judicial approval of non-voting
stock in this country. An English court had accepted the principle two years
previously.71 Thus, non-voting stock became a valid tool for corporate man-
agement. In Pennsylvania, it was given legislative sanction in 192 1.
72
The corporate form was also refined due to the removal of restrictions on
its scope of activity. During the greater period of their history as a mode of
65 McKee v. Home Say. and Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 609 (1904) noting section
1900 of the Iowa Code which permitted proxy voting but stated that "no person shall vote more
than ten per cent of the outstanding shares at the time of said election."
66EVANS, BUSINESS INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1800-1943, at 31 (1948) states
that "From 1904 until 1917 the trend of the different series diverge somewhat. New York and
Delaware incorporations, for instance, grew rapidly; the number of Texas charters remained at
about the same level throughout the period; in Maine the number fell off rapidly. To some
extent this divergence in trends reflects the readiness of the different states to 'liberalize' their
incorporation laws." He indicates, however, at 33, that "the effects of legal innovations [are]
less than might be expected." See also, STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTER-
PRISE 418-420 (1951).
67 People ex rel. Browne v. Koenig, 33 App. Div. 756, 118 N.Y.S. 136 (1909).
68 State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872 (1905).
69 Railway Frog Co. v. Haven, 109 Mass. 398 (1869); State ex rel. Danforth v. Hunton,
28 Vt. 594 (1856).
7047 Ohio St. 141, 24 N.E. 496 (1890).
711ln re Barrow Haematite Steel Co., 39 Ch. Div. 582 (1888).7 2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 161 (1921).
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business organization, corporations have been permitted to be formed for only a
limited number of purposes. This was true during the era up to the 1870's, be-
fore which incorporation was generally by special legislative act. Even in the
general acts that existed before that time, incorporation was permitted for rela-
tively few purposes. Presumably, the thought was that the privilege of incorpor-
ation should be extended only to those fields in which economic development
could not otherwise take place, and the legal advantage of incorporation would
operate as a spur to investment. Accordingly, incorporation was considered to
be a privilege extended to individuals in the hope of benefiting the general
public indirectly. With the growth of the philosophy that incorporation was
a "right" which might be exercised for a purely private profit, this restriction
was bound to change.
The grant of the right to incorporate for unlimited purposes, including
the right to act as a holding company, appeared during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Pennsylvania, by legislation in 1874 restricted corporate
formation to twenty different purposes 13 and expressly forbade the holding
of stock in another corporation "except as collateral security for a prior in-
debtedness. . . ." " By 1901 it permitted the holding of stock in other cor-
porations 7 but not until 1909 was Pennsylvania willing to permit incorpora-
tion, "For any lawful purpose not specifically designated by law." 7 California
was willing to permit incorporation "for any purpose for which individuals
may lawfully associate themselves" " as early as 1873. New Jersey permitted
incorporation for "any lawful purpose" in 1875.7" Express approval for hold-
ing companies, however, did not appear until 1888 in New Jersey."8
At their incipiency corporations were strictly limited in size. Under the
pioneer New York General Incorporation Act of 1811, a corporation was
limited to a capitalization of 100,000 dollars.80 One state, Pennsylvania, may
73 Act of 1874, April 29, P.L. 73, § 2.
741d. at § 12.
7 5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 661 (1901).
76 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3, subd. xx (1909).
77 Market St. Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 42 Pac. 225 (1895), quoting the CALIFORNIA
CIVIL CODE OF 1873, § 286. California was, at that time, in the clear minority in permitting a
corporation to hold stock of other corporations engaged in like business.
78 Dittman v. Distilling Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 537, 54 Atl. 570 (1903), citing GENERAL CORPORA-
T1ION LAW [Revision of 1875] § 10.
7
9N.J. Pub. Laws (1888) c. 269, § 1, p. 385, and c. 295, § 1, p. 445. EVANS, op. Cit. supra
note 64, at 47, states that the list of New Jersey corporations capitalized at twenty million dollars
or more between 1881 and 1902 -stirts) memories of the large combines that played a vital role
in the development of the American economy. At the time some of these companies were organ-
ized, an intention to acquire almost complete control of the fields in which they were to operate
was expressed." Some holding companies existed before 1888, but only by virtue of special
charters. See, BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY 58 et seq. (1932).
8 0 N.Y. Laws (1811) c. 67.
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be taken as representative of subsequent developments. In its acts of 1874 81
and 1889,2 the limit on capitalization was 1,000,000 dollars. An act of 1893
raised the limit to 30,000,000 dollars, 3 and it was not until 1901 that capital-
ization limits were eliminated altogether.8 4 This progression was general in
other states as well, and not all critics are agreed that the steps to unlimited
capitalization were wise ones. Professor Dodd, for instance, has stated that
"... the removal of the limitations on maximum size has brought into existence
gigantic enterprises whose social and economic advantages to the community
are questioned by some of the best informed critics of our economic system." 85
Of all the devices of management control which have been men-
tioned, no-par stock is the youngest. The earliest statute providing for no-
par stock was passed in 1912.86 Almost every state has, since that time, vali-
dated no-par stock by statute. 7  Pennsylvania fell into line in 1919."8 De-
veloped for the purpose of eliminating the liability of shareholders who did
not pay the full par value of their shares, this device has created vast prob-
lems over the proper balance sheet disposition of the excess amounts paid in
over the stated value of no-par stock.
Even limited liability, today considered to be an integral part of the cor-
porate scheme, was not developed without considerable difficulty. Although
it appears that by the 1830's it was generally accepted that limited liability
was a corporate feature in the absence of a contrary statute,88 this result was
achieved in the face of numerous statutes and charters that had previously
imposed unlimited liability. The future disclosed still more instances of the
imposition of unlimited liability on stockholders.9
The measures that made limited liability a commercial possibility were
the introduction of various devices to protect corporate creditors. These de-
vices included the imposition of liability on shareholders to the extent of re-
81 Act of 1874, April 29, P.L. 73, § 11.
82 Act of 1889, May 9, P.L. 180, § 1.
83
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 262 (1893).8 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 241 (1901).
85 DODD, American Business Association Law a Hundred Years Ago and Today, in 3 LAw,
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, at 274-275 (1937).
86N.Y. Laws (1912) c. 351.
87 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 5090 (Rev. 1958).
88 Act of 1919, July 12, P.L. 914, § 1.
8) ANGELL AND AMES, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 349 (1832).
90 E.g., Mass. Act of 1809, c. 65, § 6; Charter of the Middletown Mfg. Co. granted in 1810,
pertinent parts of which can be found in Southmays v. Russ, 3 Conn. 52 (1819); Bond v. Apple-
ton, 8 Mass. 47.2 (1812), involving a New Hampshire charter to the Hillsborough Bank; see
DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at Chs. V and VI (1954). Pennsylvania
experimented with unlimited liability for one year between 1853 and 1854. See, Laws of Pa., 1853,
Act No. 356, p. 637, repealed in Laws of Pa., 1854, Act. No. 184, p. 215.
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turned capital, "1 and the requirement that shareholders pay in full the par
value of their shares.9 It was only through the guarantee of a relative balance
between the interests of the investors and the creditors that limited liability
became possible. Even so, residual areas of a larger liability remain, such as
that to employees for unpaid wages where a double liability is not uncommon. 3
The only change in the form of the corporation that has been in any
sense "anti-management" is the change toward cumulative voting, which is
the system of multiplying the number of shares owned by the number of di-
rectors to be elected and applying this total to any one or more directors in
any proportion the stockholder sees fit. This change occurred in the last third
of the nineteenth century, but even as late as 1951 it was not permitted in ten
states " and was only permissive in seventeen states." Where it is permissive,
it is generally not chosen, at least not by the more important corporations."
Cumulative voting was first adopted by Illinois, and appeared as a pro-
vision in its 1870 Constitution. By the end of the century it was part of the
law of seventeen states. "7 Pennsylvania gave it relatively early approval in
1876 98 by a statute which followed a provision for mandatory cumulative vot-
ing contained in the Constitution of 1874."9 As of 1951 it was mandatory in
twenty-one states.
The previously discussed changes in the corporate form occurred to some
extent during the entire nineteenth century, but were concentrated in the last
quarter of that century. It would not be amiss, therefore, to say that the
modern business corporation is a creature of the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. In the main, satisfaction exists with the form of the corporation.
However there have been a number of significant suggestions indicating vary-
ing degrees of dissatisfaction with it. These suggestions range from relatively
minor changes that would not disturb the legal waters unduly to suggestions
for drastic changes of a seemingly revolutionary nature.
91 Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308 (C.C.D.Me., 1824).
92 Mass. Rev. Stats. (1836) c. 38, § 16, p. 327, 330; N.H. Laws (1837) c. 322, § 14, p. 299;
Vt. Acts and Resolves (1853) Pub. Act No. 71, § 16, p. 65, 68.
93 STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 840 (2nd ed., 1949); double liability for employees wage claims
in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-514 (1935).
"
4
WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 9 (1951).
95 Ibid. 108 U. OF PA. L. REV. 755 (1960) states that it is presently mandatory in twenty-three
states and permissive in eighteen.
" WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 13.
97 Id. at 20.
98 Act of 1876, April 15, P.L. 47, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103 repealed by the Act of
1933, May 5, P.L. 364, § 1202 insofar as it relates to business corporations, by the Act of 1933,
May 5, P.L. 457, § 1302 insofar as it relates to associations, and by the Act of 1933, May 15,
P.L. 624, § 1602 insofar as it relates to incorporated institutions.
99 Pa. Constitution of 1874, Art. 1634.
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Proposals of a modest nature are of various types. There are, for instance,
eloquent pleas for a "balanced board." This means that the board should
represent many interests in addition to those of the stockholders, and that the
election of board members should be conducted in such manner that diverse
viewpoints are represented on the board of directors.' The advocates of this
view appear to be satisfied with the form of the corporation, and to be willing
to depend on the self-discipline of management as the major means of accord-
ing recognition to the public interest.
There are also the proponents of federal legislation who desire to see all
corporations formed or licensed by the federal government." 1 In this way close
supervision could be maintained over corporations, and the effect of state
competition for corporate charter business would be minimized. 2
Others, concerned chiefly with the separation of ownership and manage-
ment, are in favor of further implementation of the proxy privilege, so that
it may effectively give representation to the shareholders instead of denying
it to them.' This group would provide for the obtaining of pertinent in-
formation concerning the affairs of the corporation, for reimbursement of
proxy fight expenses under certain circumstances even though dissidents were
defeated, and for a general strengthening of the Securities and Exchange
Commission powers in regard to proxies.
Another suggestion is to entirely eliminate non-voting shares, qualified
voting shares, and contingent voting shares.114 The same writer also stressed
the desirability of collective shareholder action through some type of "Share-
holders' Protective Association" in which the Federal Trade Commission and
the Securities and Exchange Commission would be represented. Another
writer favors the minority representation made possible by cumulative voting." 5
An adaptation of the concept of the "voting trust" has appeared to some
commentators to offer aid in the direction of legitimatizing the power of man-
agement. One line of thinking has been to add a "second chamber," distinct
100 BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS (1945); BROWN AND SMITH, THE DIRECTOR
LOOKS AT HIS JOB (1957); COPELAND AND TOWL, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT (1947); HURFF, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ENTERPRISE IN THE LARGE CORPORATION
(1950); WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 94, at 13.
101 REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM (1950). The first part of this book
contains an excellent survey of current criticisms of the corporation and a review of suggested
legal "curatives."
102 JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 306-307 (1909), contains the "Summary of Plan of William
Jennings Bryan for the Regulation of Trusts."
103EMERSON AND LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954); and on SEC power to
oust officers, see HORNSTEIN, A NEW FORUM FOR STOCKHOLDERS, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1945).
1 04DOUGLAS, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1330 (1934).
105 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 94.
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from the board of directors, to which shareholders would surrender all rights
save the right to receive dividends. This body would review the major policy
decisions of the board of directors which have an impact on the public or
are made in conflict of interest cases. An adaptation of that idea is that stock
be issued in such a form that the shareholder can, if he wishes, transfer his
voting rights to a trustee who would act in his interest." 6 These suggestions
express a basic satisfaction with the shareholder-oriented basis of the present
system or possibly a feeling that drastic changes are impossible to attain.
Other writers, however, are not so limited in their aims and would favor
broad changes of a seemingly revolutionary nature. This group views the
basic problem to be the composition of the board of directors and would favor
some scheme to alter its make-up. Exemplary of this group is Professor
Robert Aaron Gordon, who would favor a change in both the function and
the composition of the board of directors. His view is that improving the
quality of directors is no great help because, by reason of management's con-
trol of the proxy machinery, they would still be selected by management and
therefore would remain a part of the "management group." 107 Instead, he
believes that management of the corporation is the proper function of the
executives alone, and that the board of directors should merely advise, appoint
the chief executive, set his compensation, and act as "management auditors"
to report on progress and the quality of leadership.' °8 He suggests that "a
new type of board" be selected which is "independent of management and
owe(s) its allegiance to no single group within or outside the company." "'
The directors should devote "a substantial part of their time to the com-
pany's affairs" and "should not try to 'run' the company." 110
Professor Gordon suggests that this might be done by electing so-called
"public representatives" to the board. He then poses the question: "Who
would select these public directors and how would we ensure that they would
not be dominated by the officials of the company?" "' It is his contention
that the Securities and Exchange Commission be given the right to approve
management selection of directors, or that certain groups be entitled to repre-
sentation."' He sees no reason, however, "to continue the anachronism of
nominal stockholders' voting on management-selected slates for the board." "'
106 ROSTOW, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible in MASON,
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETy 57-59 (1959).
107 GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 345 (1945).
108 Id. at 346.
109 Id at 350.
110 Ibid.
111 Id. at 349.




To the possible objection that this would constitute a revolution, he answers
that the "diffusion of ownership" has already resulted in control being taken
away from the shareholders, and that this proposal would merely recognize
a de facto situation."' One might comment that control has left the share-
holder group because they do not want it.
John M. Clark, who wrote some six years earlier than did Professor
Gordon, was particularly interested in the admission of labor "to the financial
councils" so it might have a voice on questions of production, and buying
and selling policy, in addition to questions generally requiring consultation
with labor today, such as working conditions and employment policies." 5
Neil W. Chamberlain, writing in 1948, presented a view that integrates
the view of Professor Gordon, who wanted public representation, and the
view of Professor Clark, who proposed labor representation. He noted that,
alongside of a board of directors responsible to shareholders, there might be
a body responsible to the employees, and a body responsible to "society at
large." This combination would name the corporate officers and would out-
line their duties which would involve impartial management with considera-
tion for the interests of all three groups."' He reasoned that since the duties
of the board of directors are now conceived to include responsibility to the
public and to employees, as well as to the stockholders, the principle of broad-
ened responsibility should now be recognized by law. Legal recognition in-
volves, in turn, a reorganization of the enterprise."'
The most revolutionary scheme is that devised by Peter F. Drucker in
his The New Society written in 1949. Concerning the right of shareholders to
vote, he says that, "A future age may well regard the idea that control of a
productive organization of human beings can be bought and sold for money,
in the same light in which we today regard the buying and selling of human
beings under slavery." 18 Investment entails economic risk but does not in-
volve political and social rights. Since stockholders at present ignore their
voting rights and look upon stock as a source of dividends or possible capital
gains, the de facto situation should be recognized and the economic rewards
of investment should be the only one accruing to them."' This, he adds,
114 Ibid.
115 CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 56 (1939).
116 CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 222 (1948).
117 Id. at 224.
118 DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 340 (1949). See also CHAYEZ, The Modern Corporation
and the Rule of Law, in MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 40 (1959).
119 DRUCKER, op. Cit. supra note 118, at 341.
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cannot apply to the "small" corporation or to subsidiary companies. It could
be accomplished within our present legal concepts for, "Instead of forty mil-
lion shares each carrying a completely spurious claim to a microscopic share
in the ownership, there would be forty million certificates of investment each
carrying a perfectly genuine claim to a share in the profits and to a share in
the assets in event of liquidation." 120 The "shares" representing "owner-
ship" would be "vested in perpetuity in the Board of Directors," 121 which
would be composed of representatives of investors, of management, and "of
the plant community and of the communities in which the enterprise oper-
ates." 122 The function of the board, instead of constituting the governing
body, would act "as a supervisor and maker of policy." 2' The working ex-




122 Id. at 342.
123 Ibid.
124 These last suggestions may be compared with the corporate structure in West Germany
whereby labor is sought to be given a voice in corporate management by representation on the
board of directors. "Special codetermination" is the corporate form whereby labor and capital
each have five men on the board with an eleventh man presumably representing the public. "Gen-
eral codetermination" simply permits the employees to elect one-third of the board. The word"codetermination" is a rather unfortunate, but doubtless final translation of the German word
"mitbestimmung." The translation is technically correct, but it hardly conveys the meaning of
"comanagement" or "codirection" or " worker's participation in management" that is carried by
the German word. See SPIRO, THE POLITICS OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION 20 (1958).
German codetermination operates in a considerably different industrial climate than that
prevalent in the United States. Union activities are more limited; the union movement itself
is centralized. MCPHERSON, Codetermination: Germany's Move Toward A New Economy, 5 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 26 (1951). Secondly, there are two managing boards in the German corporate
scheme-one which oversees extraordinary decisions, and one which is responsible for the firm's
management. HARBESON AND MEYERS, MANAGEMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 269 (1959).
Finally, there are such intangibles as the workers' attitudes toward management and authority.
Following the second World War, the British, initiated the system of placing labor on the
boards. This was done because the taint of Nazi affiliation was lacking as to labor and because it
was necessary to get the plants running. The details of the plan of selection of directors are com-
plicated and involved. It should suffice to say that the shareholders elect the labor directors after
having ratified the nominees of the union and the works councils.
In the United States both labor and management oppose such a corporate setup-labor, because
participation in active management is not a proper union objective, and management, because this
would be a surrender of its duties. MCPHERSON, supra at 20. Theorists might regard codeter-
mination as an administrative and economic monstrosity because the combination in one body of
two such diverse elements is hardly the prescription for harmony and constructive action. From
the point of view of American criticism of the modern corporate structure, it hardly answers
the question of the proper representation to be given the interests of the general public, since,
basically, only capital and labor are represented. It does warrant close observation and serious
appraisal, however, because codetermination is an example of a board of directors representing
diverse interests.
For further information, see: MCPHERSON, Codetermination: Germanys Move Toward a
New Economy, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 20 (1951); COLE, Labor Relations, in GOVERNING POST-
WAR GERMANY 361 (Litchfield ed., 1953); SPIRO, THE POLITICS OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION
(1958); BLUMENTHAL, CODETERMINATION IN THE GERMAN STEEL INDUSTRY (1956); SCHUCH-
MAN, CODETERMINATION: LABOR'S MIDDLE WAY IN GERMANY (1957); HARBESON AND MYERS,
MANAGEMENT IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 269 (1959).
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It is the thesis of this article that the "public interest" in the corporation
can only be an interest in the fact that it exists, and in the facts of its ex-
istence, namely, its form, structure and organization. To the extent that legis-
lation is directed in the public interest toward all business, it is only a col-
lateral expression of a public interest in the corporation.
Looking back over the last century and a half, one may observe that the
structure or form of the corporation has been changed. These changes were
brought about in an attempt to foster commerce and industry which would
benefit the entire public. Moreover, the changes were made in response to
the theory that the public interest could best be fostered by inducing investors
to devote more and more capital to business. The inducements took various
forms, but most of them tended to give shareholders complete freedom in
the operation of their corporations. This very freedom which gave rise to
increased material benefit to the public necessarily made possible the vast
economic power of the modern corporate giant. Such growth involved the
diffusion of shareholding and concomitant impotence or apathy of the stock-
holding group, which enabled the managers to assume the role of active lead-
ership in the large corporation. It is the unavoidable economic power of the
modern large corporation about which the public is concerned; and it is the
recent centralization of such power in the corporate manager which occasions
him in his new role to be concerned over the corporate responsibility to the
public.
The attack on the problems created by the unprecedented growth of
modern business has been through a piecemeal approach to particular evils
as they arose. As monopoly became more likely, legislation was directed
against it. As shareholders became separated from management, proxy rules
were imposed which tended to protect them. Presumably, this method of cure
can continue and even expand. Multiplication of such agencies as the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and others, has been suggested to cure
specific evils. But, as Professor Reuschlein points out: "If this be the tech-
nique to be followed, can we multiply such agencies to the degree necessary
to cover all sore spots ?" 12 Involved in the matter is the question of whether
it is better to surrender more and more power to public control through gov-
ernmental agencies as a counter-balance to management power, or to devise
an intra-corporate means by which management power might be made more
responsive to the public interest.
125 REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM 31-32 (1950).
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Attempts to restore the role of decision-making to the stockholders of
large corporations seem to be futile. Stockholder control existed when cor-
porations were considerably smaller thari they are today, and when the stock-
holders were a more homogeneous group. In any event, it is not at all clear
that the stockholders are interested in managing the corporations in which
their money is invested.'26 The philosophy seems to be, "If you don't like
the management, sell!" On the other hand, management seems unwilling to
surrender its prerogatives.
If the present situation of corporate power centers has arisen because of
legislative changes in the form and structure of the corporation, can it not
be argued that further changes in that form and structure might not be de-
vised to give legal implementation to the public responsibilities of manage-
ment? The three groups interested in the corporation are capital, labor, and
the public. Legal responsibility to those groups requires legal representation
of them.
Today, none of these groups has real representation. Shareholder con-
trol, as assumed by the statutes, does not exist in the large, widely-held cor-
poration. Public interest is not recognized by the law concerning the respon-
sibility of directors, and receives legal implementation solely in the area of
permissive charitable contributions. The interests of labor are represented
by the power of its unions, through negotiations, and through the modern
industrial counterpart of trial by battle, the strike.
The representation of interest groups other than the stockholders on the
board of directors is not new to our jurisprudence. Bondholders, for instance,
have been given that power by some state statutes. Undoubtedly, the reason
for such a move was to enable bondholders to better protect themselves in
the event of default on the obligations held by them. Generally, their right
to vote for directors comes into being only upon default, but the shareholders
regain the right when the corporation has made good the default.2
The power of a corporation, with the assent of its shareholders, to give
voting rights to bondholders on corporate reorganization has been approved
since the latter half of the nineteenth century. 2 However, the ability to pro-
vide for bondholders' voting rights in the charter of incorporation and to
126 RosTow, op. cit. supra note 106, at 53 et seq.
127 TRACY, The Problem of Granting Voting Rights to Bondholders, 2 U. CH. L. REV. 208
(1934).
128 2 CooK, CORPORATIONS § 622b (5th ed., 1903), citing State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St.
354 (1872) which case was based on the provisions of an 1861 statute; New England Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, 6 N.E. 534 (1886), based on special statutes of 1876 and 1885.
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issue the bonds with voting provisions in them, awaiting the possible event
of default, is a more modern development. Statutes implementing this de-
vice exist in Delaware, 2 ' Louisiana,"' ° Michigan, 1' Minnesota,' Nebraska,"'
New Jersey,"' and Virgina."' Ohio apparently repealed its provision for
bondholder voting in 1955.1386
There is nothing particularly sacred about the exclusive right of share-
holders to vote for the board of directors. Of course, the problem of giving
legal representation to bondholders is considerably simpler than that of giving
it to the public interest, for the bondholders are an easily identifiable group,
and the interest of each bondholder can be measured in money. A shift to
representation of the public and of employees would be only slightly more
drastic in theory, although considerably more difficult in practice." 7  At the
present at least one state permits employee representatives to sit on the board
of directors."8
Were the board of directors to represent the interests of capital, labor
and the public, the duties of the directors would necessarily run to all three
groups. Perhaps, then, a later-day court, faced with a problem like that faced
by Justice Ostrander in the Ford case, could decide that the directors of the
corporation had the right to surrender some part of the monetary interests
of the stockholders in favor of the general welfare of the public. Also, if
the board owed duties to labor, that fact might keep it from viewing each
demand from labor as a threat to sovereignty.
The economic implications of such suggestions are extremely broad. Cur-
rently, the premise on which industry bases its activities is the desirability of
the maximization of profit. This in turn rests on the operation of a free price
system, which fosters technological progress and lower prices. Management
attempts to lower its costs and to increase its revenues. As a result, the cum-
ulative effect of this attempt is a tendency towards an economy-wide efficiency
129 8 DEL. C. § 221.
130 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. (West) 12: 32H.
181 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.36 (1937).
S32 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.26, subd. 12.
133 REv. STATS. NEBR. (1943) § 21-166, reissue of 1954.
1"4N. J. STATS. ANN. 14: 10-10.1.
135VA. CODE § 13.1-32 (1950).
136 Eliminated from Act of Oct. 11, 1955, Laws of Ohio, Vol. 126, p. 32, PAGE'S OHIo REV.
CODE § 1701-1701.99 (Supp.). Illinois has held that a by-law providing that bondholders can
vote for directors is contrary to the State Constitution. Durkee v. People ex rel. Askren, 155
Ill. 354, 40 N.E. 626 (1895).
187 One criticism of such a scheme is that it may merely add "new groups of apathetic and
disinterested voters to the masses of stockholders who now fail to exercise their franchise intelli-
gently." ROSTOW, op. cit. supra note 104, at 56.
18 MAss. GEN. LAWS, c. 156, § 23 (1932).
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in production. In aid of this tendency, anti-trust legislation fosters compet-
itive conditions which will enable a free price system to exist. However, to
the extent that recognition of the public interest would introduce other fac-
tors into managerial decisions than the maximization of profit, the benefits
of a free price system would be lessened for increased profit would not neces-
sarily be the sole goal of business.
To some extent the current move in the direction of "management control"
also substitutes values other than maximum profits into the determination of
management decisions. The goals of management can, conceivably, be in
the direction of building a corporate empire for its own sake, for the per-
petuation of managerial control, for the acquisition of large managerial com-
pensation, or in the interest of outside groups such as banking interests.
The suggestions for returning corporate control to the shareholders, there-
fore, appear to be more in line with orthodox economic thinking because they
are entirely consonant with the concept of the maximization of profit within
a competitive system as the greatest public, as well as corporate, good. Other
suggestions which have been made to introduce other interests into manage-
ment decision-making may possibly involve the risk of the unpredictable effect
of further tampering with a price system that is relatively free. As Dean
Rostow has said, "The more important problem, however, is the orientation
of legitimate business policy: should it be essentially economic in purpose,
or should it become an ambiguous amalgam of economic and noneconomic
themes ?" '
From the point of view of the historical development of the corporation,
a change in the corporate form to permit the introduction of other interests,
such as labor and the public, is neither unprecedented nor impossible. But
whether or not such a change is possible as a matter of politics, whether it
is workable as a form of industrial organization, or whether it is wise from
the point of view of the economy of the nation, are social and economic
questions which can only be determined by evolution of the corporate role
in the modern community.
139 ROSTOW, op. cit. supra note 106, at 71.
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